Whatever you want it to be?
Whatever feels right?
Whatever works?
Whatever is said sincerely?
Whatever is intended?
No, no, no, no, and no.
Truth is that which corresponds to reality.
A statement or an idea that corresponds to the way the world really is - that's what truth is.
You might object, "No one can know the way the world really is."
And to that I ask, "Is that the way the world really is, that no one can know the way the world really is?"
If the reply is yes, then we can know the way the world really is, because you are saying that the way the world really is, is that we can't know the way the world really is. And in doing so, you are affirming that we can indeed know the way the world really is. But, at the same time you are denying that we can know the way the world really is.
Denying and affirming the truth of a particular proposition at the same time in the same sense violates the most foundation principle of logic, that being the law of non-contradiction. Something cannot be both true and false at the same time in the same sense.
So am I right or am I wrong?
Because I can't be both.
Right?
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9 comments:
What is reality and what is knowable about reality are two different questions.
The first question is easy: reality is that which is. This is slightly different than “that which corresponds to reality.”
The second question is harder but has a definite answer none-the-less. And here it is: the only thing that we can know with certainty is that we exist and that we can know nothing else with certainty. This is proven in two ways.
Source Skepticism:
We can not verify the reliability of our knowledge. For example, you probably remember where your car is, but how do you know that your memory is reliable. The simple answer is that you remember specific incidents where your memory was correct. But, by doing so, you are using your memory to qualify your own memory. This is like using a measuring stick to test the accuracy of the same stick.
Radical Skepticism:
We can’t disprove radical assumptions about the history of the universe. For example, we can’t disprove that an evil demon just now created the universe complete with false memories and false evidence of a past. The existence of such a demon can no more be disproved than the existence of a god can be disproved.
A Very Important Note:
To say that truth is “that was corresponds to reality” is inaccurate in a subtle way. Truth is “that which is,” not “that which corresponds to that which is.”
To insert the word “corresponds” is to relativize truth, which then becomes “relative” to truth via a “correspondent.”
Although subtle, the difference is a dangerous one. If we relativize truth, then we relativize moral truth. If we relative moral truth we nullify rational, objective ethics and open the door to any moral code imaginable (e.g. religions). Right and wrong lose their absolute meaning; that is, they become relative (e.g. relative to whatever God says).
We must choose our words carefully at the risk loosing all rationality.
I'm not sure how the use of a 'correspondent' relativizes truth. From the correspondence theory of truth I am most familiar with, the truth-bearer is what corresponds with the truth-maker. The relation is asymmetrical between the truth-bearer and truth-maker. In a sense, the truth-maker (the proposition) is relative to the truth-bearer (the reality)- but only in the sense that what makes a *proposition true is the reality that content of the proposition is about. This doesn't lead to the type of relativism that I think you have in mind though.
If the reverse were the case, in that the relation between truth-bearer and truth-maker were still asymmetrical, but the truth-maker is what corresponded to the truth-bearer, and what made the truth-maker have the state it had was in virtue of the content of the truth-bearer (the proposition), then the type of relativism that you have in mind would follow. But again, it doesn't, or at least the correspondence theory of truth that is traditionally understood (starting with Aristotle up to Bertrand Russell).
Ok, I am going to pick at a few more comments you made.
1. Your statement that the only thing we can know with certainty is that we exist is an argument that is loaded with problems. First off, before you state that we exist, shouldn't you at least define existence? I think your statement (and all variations of this Cartesian argument) get it backwards. It first asserts the existence of a thing and states the existence can be known with certainty. Yet it then in turn claims (which you haven't but I'm 'certain' you eventually would) claims that whole classes of statements, from ones about gravitational theory to metaphysical ones cannot be known with the same certainty. Unfortunately, existence would be a metaphysical statement that would be denied the certainty your first statement claims, while at the same time your claim (I know with certainty that I exist) assumes it!.
Secondly, the next two claims seem to be the product of a fallacy of composition. Just because knowledge, (which I will assume based on your argument is knowledge that is abstracted from a knower and what is known) cannot show the reliability of memory, you conclude a species of skepticism. However, knowledge is a part of the composition of *man, and ought not be taken in isolation from *man. Taken in isolation I would agree with your skepticism. Yet, *man, with knowledge, sensory powers, body, etc is what knows. Just because an abstracted part of the nature of man cannot reach the certainty you desire, it does not follow that all of *man does.
Thirdly, you seem to assume a univocal view of knowledge. I am assuming that Larry, who attends a Thomistic seminary, does not. Thomists (and Aristotle) hold to an analogous understanding of knowledge. It doesn't follow that because one doesn't reach a mathematical certainty with all propositions, that all propositions are not certain. Use the tools of metaphysics to deal with metaphysical issues (like what existence is).
Fourthly, I'm not sure that just because one cannot reach a *mathematical certainty with propositions that are not in the class of mathematics, the leap you make to radical and source skepticism is warranted. That's a broad jump, almost the kind of jump that a certain skeptic David Hume would accuse natural theologians of, only with respect to a different topic. Skeptics can reason from some to all as much as metaphysicians do sometimes. I.E.: I have been mistaken once, therefore I could have been mistaken always.
Davis,
Actually, they’re not my assertions - it would be wrong of me to take credit for 300 years of post enlightenment thought.
Let me try to help out with the distinction between reality and something that mealy corresponds with reality.
Mathematically, the difference between something that correspond with a thing and that thing itself is one of value (think mathematical value). Two things that correspond with one another share the same relative position (on a graph or in a matrix) but not necessarily the same value (see matrix theory and/or linear algebra).
The consequence is this: only something other than X can correspond with X. Simply put, if something corresponds with X, it is not X. That is, X can not correspond with itself.
The difference may appear minor in words, but philosophically and mathematically speaking, the difference has big implications. Like I showed in my earlier post, it opens the door to the realtivation of truth and – consequently - moral truth. Like in matrix theory, truth cannot correspond with itself. It can only correspond with something other than itself.
To say otherwise is to relegates morality to a relative state (e.g. relative to God or anyone's personal opinion) rather than an objective state.
The important question then becomes this: is reality subjecitve (relative to someone or something’s personal view) or is reality objective. Apply the same question to moral truth.
Does that help?
I think you are equivocating on the term 'correspondence'. You have done a wonderful job of explaining why if the term 'correspondence' is defined in philosophy the exact same way it is in mathematics, problems follow. However, if you scroll back to my first post, you will notice that I did not define 'correspondence' that way, and am not using it for the correspondence theory of truth in that way. (Ditto for other correspondence theorists). Hence- this problem doesn't really follow from it.
Understood. Thanks Davis. This was an excellent discussion topic.
Thanks,
Ian
No problem. If you ever want to continue this (the other issues), shoot me an email at tuquoquethoughts@yahoo.com
Davis,
Since you offered, this is a question that I posed to Larry. I haven't received an answer back yet, but I understand that he is out of town.
The quesiton is this:
What fullfilled prophecies in the bible convinced you that the supernatural content must be true?
I'm trying to understand why Christians believe in the bible's supernatural content.
Thanks,
Ian
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